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How can we disagree with a bald-faced liar? Can we actively 
disagree if it is common ground that the speaker has no intent to 
deceive? And why do we disapprove of bald-faced liars so 
strongly? Bald-faced lies pose problems for accounts of lying and 
of assertion. Recent proposals try to defuse those problems by 
arguing that bald-faced lies are not really assertions, but rather 
performances of fiction-like scripts, or different types of language 
games. In this paper, I raise two objections to the fictionalist view, 
and then offer an analysis of how we disagree with bald-faced liars. 
I conclude that bald-faced lies are assertions, and that in 
pronouncing a bald-faced lie, the speaker tries to make it common 
ground that the assertion was in good standing qua assertion. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
A dictionary definition of a bare or bald-faced lie has it that it is a falsehood ‘told with 
utter confidence without trying to conceal the fact that it is false, especially a planned or 
deliberate falsehood’1 How can we disagree with a bald-faced liar? Answering this 
question is important to understand what lying is, why it is morally wrong, and to gain a 
better understanding of disagreement. It is also practically important in the current 
political climate.  
In an article from early 2019, Dahlia Lithwick reported evidence that Donald 
Trump directed his former lawyer, Michael Cohen, to lie to congress regarding 
negotiations to build a Trump Tower in Moscow. The allegation was supported by 
substantial documentation collected in Robert Mueller’s report, and later confirmed by 
Cohen. Faced with strong documentary evidence and Cohen’s testimony, Trump 
                                               
1 Definition online from Your Dictionary: https://www.yourdictionary.com/barefaced-lie (accessed 
December 2019). 
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accused Cohen of being ‘a lying liar’ and said that the evidence in Mueller’s report was 
‘fake.’ These claims by Trump are, arguably, bald-faced lies, and, as Lithwick says, 
they have effects on journalism, politics, and society: 
 
We’ve grown so hopelessly accustomed to a journalism reduced to daily fact 
checking, and a politics reduced to daily fact checking, and fact checking 
reduced to daily white noise that we forget that there is more to daily public life 
than endlessly correcting the record. (Lithwick, 2019. My emphasis) 
 
Sorensen (2007) has argued, provocatively, that bald-faced lies do not deserve 
moral disapproval: If it is common ground that an assertion that p is false, then surely 
the bald-faced liar does not intend to deceive his audience about p (since they take for 
granted that it is false). And if the speaker does not intend to deceive the audience about 
p, then bald-faced lies should not be reprehensible. The fact that we do tend to morally 
disapprove of bald-faced lies should be a mere ‘rhetorical illusion.’ 
Bald-faced lies seem to pose problems for some accounts of lying and for some 
theories of assertion but it is not commonly recognized that bald-faced lies are also a 
problem for accounts of disagreement. If it is common ground that a bald-faced lie is 
false, and that the speaker has no intention to deceive, then disagreement with the bald-
faced liar should not be possible. However, as we will see, these disagreements seem to 
exist – endlessly trying to correct the record is surely one way of them arising. 
Moreover, Sorensen’s claim that our disapproval of a bald-faced liar is a ‘rhetorical 
illusion’ does not sit comfortably with our condemnation, for instance, of Donald 
Trump’s lie on 4 January 2019: ‘I never said I was going to build a concrete wall.’  
Faced with the problem of categorizing bald-faced lies, theorists have mostly 
adopted one of two strategies. Either they insist, flying in the face of first-appearances 
and disregarding Sorensen’s argument, that any bald-faced lie that p intends to deceive 
about p.2 Alternatively, they argue that the intention to deceive regarding p is not 
essential to lying.3 Here I discuss a third possibility: that bald-faced lies are not lies 
because they are not assertions. This view is defended by Jessica Keiser (2016) and 
Ishani Maitra (2018). Keiser claims that bald-faced ‘liars’ are in fact engaging in 
various language-games that do not amount to conversations. Meanwhile, Maitra argues 
for a constitutive view of assertion, where to assert is to be responsive to evidence in the 
right way. Bald-faced liars violate this constitutive rule so blatantly that they must be 
doing something else. Maitra’s hypothesis is that they are more like actors following a 
script. I will call these kinds of view fictionalism about bald-faced lies. 
I have two principal aims in this paper. The first is to give two objections to 
fictionalism about bald-faced lies. The objections affect the fictionalist view, and show 
that bald-faced lies are assertions. My second aim is to show that this fact can explain 
how we disagree with bald-faced liars, and how these liars often undermine their 
audiences’ epistemic assurance, i.e., gaslight their audiences. It is because bald-faced 
lies are assertions made ‘with utter confidence and without trying to conceal’ their 
falsehood that they impose asserted falsehoods on context. Getting away with a bald-
faced lie is a form of dominating conversational contexts. I hence disagree with 
Sorensen’s conclusion: the blatant imposition of an asserted falsehood on context 
deserves moral disapproval.  
                                               
2 E.g., Lackey (2013). I’m not persuaded by her distinction between deceiving and being deceptive. For 
discussion, see Fallis (2015). 
3 E.g., Sorensen (2007), Carson (2006, 2010), Fallis (2009), Saul (2012), Stokke (2013). 
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In Section 2, I introduce examples of bald-faced lies, and set up the background 
and motivation for fictionalism about them. Section 3 offers two objections to 
fictionalism. In Section 4, I sketch the illocutionary and perlocutionary effects of bald-
faced lies which can help explain how they gaslight their audiences, and also how we 
can disagree with bald-faced liars. 
 
2 BALD-FACED LIES: CASES, ASSERTIONS, AND FICTION-MAKING 
 
There are familiar cases normally used to illustrate the main features of bald-faced lies. 
The cases raise problems for theories of lying and of assertion. Here, I present three of 
such cases, all of which prima facie reveal a lack of intent to deceive the audience about 
what is literally said in the bald-faced lie.4 
 
2.1 Bald-faced lies: examples 
 
There are numerous examples of bald-faced lies from real life and from fiction. The first 
case below is from the film The Godfather 2, the second is from Åsne Seierstad’s 
reporting from Iraq before the fall of Saddam Hussein, and the final is a made-up 
philosophical example.  
 
Case 1: Frankie Five Angels 
‘Frankie Five Angels’ Pantangelli is called in as a surprise witness in a senate 
hearing to testify against the mob boss Michael Corleone. Frankie, who had 
fallen out with Michael, was under government protection and had made an 
agreement with government officials to tell the court of the manifold crimes for 
which Michael was responsible. In order to prevent this, Michael flies Frankie’s 
brother Vincenzo—mafioso and caretaker of Frankie’s children—over from 
Sicily to attend the hearings. On the day of the hearing, Frankie turns around and 
locks eyes with Vincenzo, whose presence reminds him that by testifying against 
Michael he puts the honour of his family as well as the wellbeing of his children 
at risk. Subsequently, Frankie surprises the government officials by going 
against their agreement and claiming under oath to have no knowledge of any 
wrongdoings committed by Michael Corleone. This is a paradigmatic example 
of a bald-faced lie in which there is no intent to deceive; there is mutual 
knowledge among the hearing attendees that Michael is guilty of murder, etc., 
and that Frankie has first-hand knowledge of these facts. (Keiser, 2016, p. 462) 
 
Case 2: Takhlef 
‘Everything [President Saddam Hussein] did in the past was good and 
everything he will do in the future is good’ (Seierstad, 2003, p. 30). ‘How can 
you be so sure about that?’ Åsne Seierstad asks her Iraqi minder. With a glare 
Takhlef answers ‘I know it as a result of my belief in the party and his 
leadership.’ Åsne Seierstad does not press Takhlef. She does not want to join the 
many reporters expelled from Iraq. Instead of voicing her disgust at the 
overwhelming number of Saddam Hussein portraits, she makes flattering 
remarks about the President’s appearance… Everybody realizes that Takhlef’s 
description of Saddam Hussein’s performance is a lie. Everybody knows 
                                               
4 I do not consider ‘polite untruths’: falsifications that are not lies. See Shiffrin (2014); see also Mahon 
(2015), Isenberg (1964, p. 473). These cases can be characterized as indirect assertions, see García-
Carpintero (2019). By contrast, in bald-faced lies there is no plausible indirectly asserted truth. 
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Takhlef is lying and everybody knows everyone knows it. If lying requires an 
intention to deceive, then common knowledge that Takhlef is lying is 
impossible. (Sorensen, 2007, pp. 251-252) 
 
Case 3: Cheating student 
Suppose that a college Dean is cowed whenever he fears that someone might 
threaten a law suit and has a firm, but unofficial, policy of never upholding a 
professor’s charge that a student cheated on an exam unless the student 
confesses in writing to having cheated. The Dean is very cynical about this and 
believes that students are guilty whenever they are charged. A student is caught 
in the act of cheating on an exam by copying from a crib sheet. The professor 
fails the student for the course and the student appeals the professor’s decision to 
the Dean who has the ultimate authority to assign the grade. The student is privy 
to information about the Dean’s de facto policy and, when called before the 
Dean, he (the student) affirms that he didn’t cheat on the exam… The student 
says this on the record in an official proceeding and thereby warrants the truth of 
statements he knows to be false. He intends to avoid punishment by doing this. 
He may have no intention of deceiving the Dean that he didn’t cheat. (Carson, 
2006, p. 290) 
 
All cases involve common knowledge that what the speaker says is false. It also 
seems, as Sorensen says, that in these cases our ordinary intuitions tell us that the 
speaker is lying: ‘Everybody knows that Takhlef is lying and everybody knows 
everybody knows it.’ 
 
2.2 Theoretical decisions about lying, asserting, disagreeing 
 
Prima facie, bald-faced lies are a problem for some theories of assertion, for instance 
for so-called communicative intention theories, a family of views where to assert is to 
express one’s belief with the intention that the hearer acquire that same belief. Take for 
example Bach and Harnish’s reflexive communicative intention account: 
 
S asserts that p iff S expresses  
(i) the belief that p, and  
(ii) the intention that H believe that p. (Bach and Harnish, 1979, p. 
42)5 
 
Bald-faced lies pose a problem for such theories because the bald-faced liar does 
not seem to have the intention that the hearer come to believe that p. After all, in the 
cases above, it is taken for granted by speaker and hearers that what is asserted is false; 
and the speaker has no intention to bring about the belief that the assertion is true. 
Bald-faced lies do not appear to raise problems for other accounts of assertion, 
for instance Stalnaker’s,6 or Williamson’s.7 According to Williamson, assertion is 
                                               
5 See Pagin (2014) for discussion. There are other reasons to reject communicative intentions theories of 
assertion. See Sperber and Wilson (1986, pp. 256–7), for criticism of Bach and Harnish’s reflexive 
intention view. It is not the aim of this paper to rehearse the reasons for and against various theories; for 
present purposes, it suffices that bald-faced lies raise problems for communicative intention theories, but 
not for constitutive rule accounts. 
6 Stalnaker (1999, 2002).  
7 Williamson (1996). 
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regulated by constitutive rules, which are distinct from other norms that may apply to 
them (of relevance, politeness, etc.) That constitutive rule must differentiate assertion 
from other speech acts to which the more general cooperative norms also apply. Now, 
the violation of a constitutive rule for an action type does not mean that the action was 
not performed. 
 
When one breaks a rule of a game, one does not thereby cease to be playing that 
game. When one breaks a rule of a language, one does not thereby cease to be 
speaking that language; speaking English ungrammatically is speaking English. 
Likewise, presumably, for a speech act: when one breaks a rule of assertion, one 
does not thereby fail to make an assertion. One is subject to criticism precisely 
because one has performed an act for which the rule is constitutive (Williamson, 
1996, p. 491)  
 
It should not be controversial that breaking the rules of a game is compatible 
with playing it. In the 1986 football World Cup quarter-final, Maradona scored a goal 
with a hand (not a foot), and joked about the interference of the hand of God. 
Williamson argues that assertion in particular is regulated by the knowledge rule 
(KR): 
(KR) One must: assert p only if one knows that p. 
 
Nonetheless, bald-faced lies do not pose a problem for Williamson’s account, although 
they blatantly violate (KR): not only does the speaker not know that p, this fact is 
common knowledge. 
Meanwhile, according to Stalnaker’s account of assertion, to assert that p is to 
propose that p become common ground: 
 
It is common ground that φ in a group if all members accept (for the purpose of 
the conversation) that φ, and all believe that all accept that φ, and all believe that 
all believe that all accept that φ, etc. (Stalnaker, 2002, p. 716) 
 
Acceptance is a belief-like attitude, although not necessarily a belief. It might be 
an assumption, or a mere ‘acceptance for the purposes of an argument or inquiry’:   
 
To accept a proposition is to treat it as true for some reason. One ignores, at least 
temporarily, and perhaps in a limited context, the possibility that it is false. 
(Stalnaker, 2002, p. 716) 
 
Stokke (2013) deploys Stalnaker’s account to define lying, and in a way that can 
accommodate bald-faced lies. He claims that to lie is to assert what one believes to be 
false.8 The bald-faced liar who asserts p wants p to be added to the common ground, 
even though the audience doesn’t believe p. In the next section, I will suggest that we 
should nonetheless doubt the Stalnakerian notion of assertion. For now, what is 
important is that this account abandons the intention to deceive, which was essential to 
the classic understanding of lying.9  
Now, bald-faced lies are also a problem for some compelling views of 
agreement and disagreement. Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009) distinguish between 
                                               
8 Stokke (2013: 43). 
9 The Augustinian definition states: ‘the fault of a person who tells a lie consists in his desire to deceive in 
expressing his thought’ (Augustine [395] in Deferrari (1952), pp. 55-56). 
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agreements in state and agreements in activity, from which we can devise closely 
related notions of disagreement: 
 
Disagreement in state: Two people, A and B, disagree about p only if A accepts 
p and B rejects p. 
Disagreement in activity: A and B engage in the activity of disagreeing about p 
when they debate, argue, discuss, or negotiate whether p.10 
 
If we take Sorensen’s definition of bald-faced lies at, well, face value, it would 
seem that the bald-faced liar and his audience cannot disagree in state about p, since 
they both accept that p is false. And it is hard to see how they can disagree in activity as 
to whether p when they all take for granted that p is false, and furthermore take for 
granted that the speaker has no intention to deceive. 
 
2.3 Fictionalism about bald-faced lies 
 
In this section, I introduce the new take on bald-faced lies mentioned in the 
introduction: that they are not lies because they are not assertions, a view that is 
defended by Jessica Keiser and Ishani Maitra.  
Keiser (2017) argues that bald-faced lies are not moves in a conversation, but 
moves in some distinct language game. As such, they do not require us to abandon the 
classic Augustinian definition. Keiser takes it for granted that to lie is directly to assert 
what one believes to be false. She also holds a definition of assertion that is close to that 
of Bach and Harnish: 
 
Assertion: By uttering s, U asserts p iff for some audience A 
1. U meant p. 
2. U utters s R-intending that (1) will provide A with a reason to believe that U 
believes p. (Keiser 2016, p. 470) 
 
Here, R-intending is a species of reflexive intention. On this definition, to assert 
is to intend to give the audience a reason to believe that the speaker believes that p. This 
definition, coupled with the assumption that to lie is directly to assert what one believes 
to be false, entails that lying involves an intention to deceive. Keiser’s claim, in short, is 
that there cannot be lies without the intent to deceive, by definition. Since it is common 
ground that a bald-faced liar says what is believed to be false in the context of the 
utterance, clearly the audience is provided with no reason to believe that the speaker 
believes what is being said. Hence, Keiser concludes, the speaker must be doing 
something other than ‘conversation’: 
 
There is no reflexive communicative intention over and above the transmission 
of this content—he does not intend his audience to do anything with that content 
on the basis of the recognition of his intention—so he [Pantangelli] does not 
perform an illocutionary act or make a move in a conversation. But by 
performing this locution under oath and in this setting, he makes a move in a 
different game—the courtroom game. (Keiser, 2016, p. 471) 
 
                                               
10 Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009, pp. 60). See also Marques (2014) on doxastic disagreements, and 
Marques and Cohnitz (2014) for further discussion of disagreement problems. 
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The problem with this argument, however, is that it merely insists that a 
definition of assertion requiring a communicative intention simply rules out by 
definition bald-faced lies as serious counterexamples: bald-faced lies cannot be 
assertions, because, if they were, the theory of communicative intention would be 
wrong. Moreover, the solution – that all bald-faced lies are moves in language games 
other than conversation – is ad hoc. Keiser claims that Pantangelli is making a move in 
a courtroom game; but in how many language games are bald-faced lies legitimate 
‘moves’? Is the cheating student making a move in a get-away-with-cheating-at-
university game? Is Takhlef making a move in a please-your-autocratic-leader language 
game? One may wonder how speakers know what all these different language games 
are, and how they navigate between them.  
Like Keiser, Maitra (2018) argues that bald-faced lies are not assertions. She 
categorizes bald-faced lies as utterances of p that do not involve an intention to deceive 
about p. This contrasts with the alternative taxonomy which I will defend: that bald-
faced lies are assertions that p in contexts where it is common knowledge that p is false. 
Since bald-faced lies involve no intention to deceive, they are not lies, and are not 
morally wrong, she holds. 
Maitra distinguishes what she sees as real cases of bald-faced lies from other lies 
that may still be blatant and ‘undisguised’, but which do involve some intent to deceive. 
These latter cases would be knowledge-lies:11 a speaker can assert p, even though it’s 
common ground that p is false. Here, the speaker can still intend to undermine the 
audience’s confidence in not-p by insisting on p. Asserting an ‘undisguised’ lie may be 
enough to shake the confidence some other person has in not-p, which in turn can 
suffice for deception and even gaslighting. In contrast, cases like (1)-(3) involve no 
deceitful intentions.  
Maitra offers a constitutive rule for assertion that differs from Williamson’s 
knowledge-rule: 
 
Evidence-Responsiveness Rule: If a speaker S’s utterance of U is not sufficiently 
responsive to her (total) evidence that bears on p, she does not assert p via 
uttering U. (Maitra 2018, p. 72) 
 
Constitutive-rule accounts allow for a speaker to assert while violating a 
constitutive rule. However, when the violations of the rules of a game are too blatant, 
Maitra claims, we can wonder whether the participants are still playing the game, or 
whether they are engaging some other activity. Bald-faced lies are just such blatant 
violations of the norm that governs assertion. Hence, we are justified in doubting 
whether bald-faced lies are actually assertions. Now, if not assertions, what are they? 
According to Maitra, they are like performances of a script: a kind of fiction-making.  
There are indeed plausible similarities between a speaker uttering a bald-faced 
lie, and an actor performing the lines of a script. Bald-faced liars want to be on record as 
having made the utterances they made. And there are other similarities: 
 (1) A speaker S who utters a bald-faced lie p knows that p is false, knows that 
audience knows that p is false, etc. The same happens when an actor on stage 
tells a fellow actor: ‘You are the most earnest person I know!’ 
(2) S can be thought of as following a script, just like an actor on stage. 
                                               
11 See Sorensen (2010). 
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(3) S’s performance is not only intended partly for S’s immediate interlocutor. 
Crucially, it is also intended for others, beyond the immediate audience. This 
can be the same for actors who address people who are off stage. 
(4) Finally, speaker S and hearer H are aware of (1) to (3). (Maitra, 2019, p. 76) 
 
In the next section, I will offer two objections to the fictionalist view, which support the 
claim that bald-faced lies are assertions. 
 
3 TWO OBJECTIONS 
 
We accuse bald-faced liars of lying, while they may attempt to defuse that accusation by 
deflecting the criticism to us. Also, bald-faced liars often try to obfuscate the 
illocutionary force of the speech act they had performed. Both are indications that they 
asserted. These are problems for Keiser and Maitra, as I will now show. 
 
3.1 ‘That’s a lie!’ is not a criticism of fiction 
 
Maitra’s comparison of bald-faced liars with actors making a performance is 
problematic, in spite of the apparent initial plausibility, because we accuse bald-faced 
liars of lying, but not performers. In the same way, we do not accuse those who state 
non-assertions, make wild conjectures or crack jokes, for instance, of lying. That means 
that accusing bald-faced liars of lying – something we do – is a problem for Maitra and 
Keiser alike. 
Imagine the following situation. The actor who says to her fellow-actor on stage 
‘You are the most earnest person I know!’ while believing quite the opposite to be the 
case, and believing that this is common knowledge. Nobody should accuse such an 
actor of lying during the performance: neither the audience nor the other actors. 
Suppose now that people are chatting and the actor interrupts the performance and 
addresses the audience in a very annoyed manner saying: ‘Do you think I enjoy 
standing on stage every night reciting these lines to this cynic?’ The actor is being 
honest, but the only criticism due is for breaking character, not for previously lying. 
By contrast, if we imagine Takhlef or Pantangelli ‘breaking character’ and 
‘going off script’ to tell the truth – that Corleone is a criminal, that Hussein is not a 
wonderful president – we would not now criticize them for breaking character, unless, 
of course, we were Corleone or Hussein. Those who benefit from bald-faced lies, or 
who make them, often accuse their accusers of being the liars. Indeed, the media 
engaged in checking the truth of Trump’s claims every day are accused of being 
‘dishonest’ or ‘crooked’; they are ‘the lying New York Times’, ‘the fake Washington 
Post.’ These are Trump’s go-to insults when talking about the press whose job it is to 
check him. This strategy is called DARVO – an acronym for deny, attack, and reverse 
the victim and the offender – and is a tactic that domestic abusers often deploy. It is also 
a giveaway that the bald-faced liar did lie and, hence, did assert.12 
 
3.2 If cornered, does the bald-faced liar ‘walk-back’? 
 
                                               
12 See for instance Frey (2018). 
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If it were true that bald-faced lies are a kind of fiction-making, it should be ok to say so. 
But we condemn seeming ‘walk-backs’13 of the assertoric force of bald-faced lies that 
cast them as non-assertions. Two examples illustrate this.  
During the brief period Anthony Scaramucci was a spokesperson for Donald 
Trump, he suggested that Trump had pushed back his news conference from 15 
December 2016 because ‘[Trump]’s a very precise, very detail-oriented guy’ who wants 
to have ‘all of the answers to all of the types of questions that’s he’s gonna get thrown.’ 
Trump had earlier tweeted, on December 12, that he would have a news conference “in 
the near future to discuss the business, Cabinet picks and all other topics of interest”.14 
In late 2019, it was still not clear if he divested from his businesses, and many cabinet 
positions were never filled.15 Once it became clear that the December 15 news 
conference would not happen, Scaramucci gave an interview in which he commented on 
Trump’s tweets on the matter: ‘Trump’s claims are to be taken symbolically and not 
literally.’ 
Early in 2019, and during then ongoing investigation of the special council into 
Russian interference in the 2016 US elections, and of suspicious links between Trump, 
Trump associates, and Russian officials, Rudy Giuliani said on January 20 that Trump 
told him the negotiations over a Moscow skyscraper continued through ‘the day I won,’ 
and that the president recalled ‘fleeting conversations’ about the deal after the Trump 
Organization signed a letter of intent to pursue it. This came after days of conflicting 
declarations by Giuliani on whether he had any knowledge of collusion. The timeline of 
the negotiations mattered since it could show that there were links between Trump 
associates and Russia.  
As it turns out, this statement was true and answered correctly the question 
under discussion: Did Trump Tower Moscow negotiations continue until after the 
election? Notice that Giuliani’s claim was a bona fide Stalnakerian assertion – it 
reduced the possibilities that were left open by interlocutors, given the purposes of the 
conversation. But Giuliani didn’t have the intention that his interlocutors believe what 
he said. Allowing for this assertion to stand was a problem for Trump and his campaign 
officials. The next day, Giuliani said: 
 
My recent statements about discussions during the 2016 campaign between 
Michael Cohen and then-candidate Donald Trump about a potential Trump 
Moscow ‘project’ were hypothetical and not based on conversations I had with 
the president.16 (My emphasis). 
 
What were Scaramucci and Giuliani doing? Were they correcting the record, 
pointing out that previous discourse was a kind of fiction-making, ‘symbolic’ or 
‘hypothetical’? Or were they doing something else? 
 In recent work, Laura Caponetto (2018) draws on Austin's distinction between 
the illocutionary and perlocutionary effects of speech acts to explain how we undo 
things with words. Illocutionary effects are determined by their force and enter the 
context automatically. In contrast, perlocutionary effects can be unpredictable and are 
                                               
13 I’m borrowing the phrase from the journalist Maggie Haberman (2019), not agreeing that it accurately 
describes what is going on. 
14 See McCaskill (2016). 
15 See Miller and Jaffe (2019) in the Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-
security/in-aftermath-of-ukraine-crisis-a-climate-of-mistrust-and-threats/2019/12/24/03831e3e-2359-
11ea-a153-dce4b94e4249_story.html. 
16 As reported by Haberman in the NY Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/21/us/politics/giuliani-
trump-tower-russia.html 
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independent of whether the act was felicitous. Caponetto then distinguishes three ways 
of undoing things with words. The first is via annulments, which apply to fatally 
infelicitous acts that are mistakenly taken as felicitous: the speech act was not actually 
made, and the annulment rectifies that mistake. Consider the parallel situation of the 
annulment of a marriage when the person purporting to have celebrated the ceremony 
did not have the appropriate authority to do so; this does not undo a marriage, which 
never occurred, but registers this fact. Second, the goal of retractions is to cancel 
deontic updates that were successfully generated by a past illocution, for instance, when 
one realizes that one’s claim that p is not true, or not sufficiently warranted, and says “I 
guess I was wrong, I take that back”. In the marriage analogy, retractions are more like 
a divorce. Finally, amendments allow speakers to alter the force of their own acts 
without changing the broad kind of act performed: constative or directive. For instance, 
speakers can amend an assertion that p by saying ‘… at least I guess that p’. 
Amendments, as Caponetto says, tamper with the normative strength of the act already 
performed. 
Now, it seems that people disapprove of what Scaramucci and Giuliani do in 
calling previous claims ‘symbolic’ or ‘hypothetical.’17 But what do they disapprove? I 
think that we must rule out two implausible answers. Scaramucci and Giuliani do not 
annul an infelicitous attempt to perform a speech act; and what they say doesn’t support 
such a hypothesis. Neither do they retract: they do not say that the former statements 
were false, wrong, or out of place. They also do not say “I take it back”.  
Nonetheless, there are two plausible interpretations of what Scaramucci and 
Giuliani are doing, which can explain why people find their actions reprehensible:  
 
(i) they are amending the illocutionary force of an assertion, or  
(ii) they are lying about the illocutionary force of that assertion.  
 
On the first interpretation, they were amending a previous assertion by 
weakening its illocutionary strength. In this case, there would have been an initial 
assertion, that assertion was reprehensible for some reason, and to avoid criticism its 
force is weakened in a way that would evade such criticism. In this case, perhaps the 
reason people condemn Scaramucci’s or Giuliani’s actions is because people perceive 
that the amendments were done just to evade criticism.  
On the second possible interpretation, Scaramucci and Giuliani were lying about 
the illocutionary force of their, or Trump’s, utterances. Trump would have lied, and then 
Scaramucci lied about that lie: not about its content, but about its illocutionary force. 
Similarly, Giuliani would have accidentally spoken the truth, and then lied about having 
asserted, not about the content of the assertion.  
The reader is free to consider the merits of each of these possibilities. Either 
way, the original act was an assertion. Hence, it was not an act of fiction-making. 
I started this section by showing that we criticize bald-faced liars in ways we do 
not (and should not) criticize performers of fictional scripts. That criticism crucially 
includes accusations of lying. Additionally, when cornered, liars often accuse those who 
publicly denounce them as the real liars. They do so defensively and to divert the 
accusation, which is an indication that they lied and asserted. Moreover, if it were true 
                                               
17 This can be confirmed in the comment section of Haberman’s article in the NY Times, for instance: 
‘This whole Giuliani-Trump thread started out as being amusing and typical for the principals in this 
comedy/drama: Lie, misdirect, obfuscate and counterattack.’ Another reader says ‘What a farce. Aren’t 
you tired of all this gaslighting, Americans?’, and someone else asks ‘What lawyer would ever, EVER 
make such hypotheticals about their client? It doesn’t pass.’ 
 11 
that bald-faced lies are not assertions, then (i) what could be amendments of the 
assertoric force of previous utterances would not be amendments at all, but 
acknowledgments that those utterances were mere conjectures to begin with. This 
would make the criticism people dedicate to these claims an unexplained mystery. On 
the other hand, (ii), the denial that those previous utterances were assertions would now 
be plain uninteresting truths, they would not be new lies. In this case, again, all the 
criticism from the people who see them as lies would also remain unexplained. In other 
words, we can only make sense of people’s strong disapproval of what such speakers 
are doing (whether they are amending or lying) if the original utterance was an 
assertion. 
 
4 GASLIGHTING AND DISAGREEMENT 
 
In this section, I argue that it is because bald-faced lies are assertions that they can 
contribute to undermining the epistemic assurance of their audience. Furthermore, it is 
in the light of this that we can finally explain how it is that we disagree with a bald-
faced liar.  
 
4.1 Undermining epistemic assurance 
 
The previous section helped to establish what I think bald-faced lies do: they are lies 
that blatantly violate assertoric norms in virtue of asserting what is taken for granted in 
the context to be false. Although I favour a constitutive-rule account, I will not argue for 
it here. I will only sketch how I think bald-faced lies serve to dominate: they do so by 
imposing false assertions in conversational contexts, and they do so by contributing to 
‘gaslighting’. It’s because bald-faced liars openly and shamelessly violate assertoric 
norms that they can often (but not necessarily) exploit illocutionary assertoric effects to 
produce additional perlocutionary effects. A common (but not necessary) perlocutionary 
effect of a bald-faced lie is that the audience acquires some credence in what was 
asserted, even if what was asserted contradicts previous beliefs.18 This is precisely what 
contributes to diminishing the audience’s confidence in what they previously believed. 
As Caponetto (2018, p. 5) succinctly explains, the difference between 
illocutionary and perlocutionary effects is that an illocutionary effect is determined by 
the force of the speech act performed, and automatically enters the context. Meanwhile, 
perlocutionary effects are those that are caused by the speech act but are not intrinsic or 
constitutive of that speech act itself. The illocutionary effects of an assertion include the 
audience’s acceptance that an act that is subject to assertoric norms has been made. If 
this is so, the fact that it is common knowledge that the speaker asserted something false 
does not suffice to cancel the illocutionary effects of assertion. If the rule of assertion is 
Williamson’s KR, for instance, in accommodating an assertion in a conversation the 
audience accepts that the speaker presents himself as knowing what he says. Bald-faced 
liars exploit this illocutionary effect: they present themselves as knowing what they say, 
although it’s common ground that they lack such knowledge. They thereby exploit 
assertoric norms, while blatantly abusing those very same norms. In this way, they 
                                               
18 Mandelbaum (2014) argues that we generally do believe what people say, even when we know that 
what they say is false. I do not wish to take a stance here on Mandelbaum’s views, but to recognize that it 
offers a seemingly plausible explanation of how bald-faced lies can help undermining an epistemic 
stance. 
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display dominance, as if saying: ‘You know I’m lying. What are you going to do about 
it?’19 
Recall that, as we saw in section 2.3, Maitra discriminates between two types of 
undisguised utterances of falsehoods: bald-faced lies (non-assertions) and other 
undisguised lies (assertions). She argues that when a violation of the rules of a game are 
too blatant, we can wonder whether the participants are still playing the game, or 
whether they are engaging some other activity. Likewise, utterances that are blatant 
violations of assertion norms would give us reasons to think that they’re not assertions. 
But Maitra wants to allow some such blatant violations of assertion norms to still be 
assertions, because the speaker may happen to intend to deceive the audience. However, 
if the criterion for discounting an utterance as an assertion were that it blatantly violates 
the relevant constitutive rule, then both types of undisguised falsehoods Maitra 
contemplates would be such non-assertions.20 It seems that Maitra is relying instead on 
the speaker’s intentions as the real difference-making criterion between assertions and 
non-assertions. But that is at odds with her own constitutive rule account, according to 
which assertion depends on evidence-responsiveness, rather than the speaker’s 
intentions. 
Moreover, any undisguised assertion of a false proposition p, whether made with 
the intent to deceive or not, can have the perlocutionary effect of undermining the 
confidence of the audience in not-p. This perlocutionary effect is independent of the 
intentions of the speaker. but of course he may intend to exploit it, and he can do so 
because an undisguised lie can produce it. It is the assertion of a clear falsehood that 
creates a conflict with what the audience believed. But since this perlocutionary effect 
does not require the speaker’s intent to produce it, the intention to deceive cannot be the 
real difference-making criterion that separates bald-faced lies from ‘undisguised’ lies 
that are assertions.  
Now, gaslighting can include not only bald-faced lies, but also contradictions, 
utter claptrap, etc. The use of such untruths can further contribute to dominate an 
audience: diminishing their epistemic assurance also diminishes their ability to resist 
manipulation. A quote often mistakenly attributed to Groucho Marx illustrates bald-
faced lies that target one’s perception: ‘who ya gonna believe, me or your own eyes?’ 
(The line is from the 1933 movie Duck Soup). In 1984, Orwell illustrates bald-faced lies 
that target one’s rationality when O’Brien asks Winston: ‘“Do you remember”, he went 
on, “writing in your diary, “Freedom is the freedom, to say that two plus two make 
four”?”’ (Orwell, 1954/1989: 286) As readers will remember, Winston will come to 
doubt that he knows this, and will accept that two plus two make five. Donald Trump 
often challenges people’s memory, for instance, when he claimed ‘I never said I was 
going to build a concrete wall.’21  
Masha Gessen often writes about the role of bald-faced lies in propaganda. At 
the end of 2018, she described authoritarian propaganda and our difficulty to 
comprehend how it operates: 
 
                                               
19 In Marques and García-Carpintero (2020), we argue that weapon uses of slurs offend because they 
make a context-update proposal that the target audience clearly does not want to accept. The overt 
violation of cooperative conversational norms is how the speaker displays domination over the addressee.  
20 Michaelson and Stokke (2019) similarly criticize Maitra’s claim here. They argue that lies can give the 
speaker some form of positional advantage over the audience. The details of their proposal differ from the 
view I offer below. 
21 Trump must know that anyone can check that he did say it, for instance, here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QguzPi-WhvM 
 13 
Totalitarian propaganda is overwhelming and inconsistent. It bombards you with 
mutually contradictory claims, which often come packaged in doublethink 
pairs… Russian propaganda is a direct descendant of totalitarian Soviet 
propaganda. Far from promoting a single guiding ideology, this kind of 
propaganda robs you of your bearings. The regime gains a monopoly on reality, 
and can make any claim whatsoever. Hannah Arendt famously described the 
totalitarian ruler’s ascendance this way: “In an ever-changing, incomprehensible 
world the masses had reached the point where they would, at the same time, 
believe everything and nothing, think that everything was possible and that 
nothing was true… Mass propaganda discovered that its audience was ready at 
all times to believe the worst, no matter how absurd, and did not particularly 
object to being deceived because it held every statement to be a lie anyhow.” 
(Gessen 2018. My emphasis.) 
 
Totalitarian propaganda rides on the back of bald-faced lies and Orwellian 
doublethink (which I discuss as meaning perversions elsewhere). 22 Orwell, Gessen, and 
Arendt knew that the effect of a tsunami of bald-faced lies in public discourse is that 
public discourse is reduced to daily white noise; they knew it well before Dahlia 
Lithwick correctly diagnosed Trump’s effect on fact checking. The result of long-term 
exposure to bald-faced lies is that cooperative, rational, norm-guided communication is 
subverted, and authoritarians gain ‘a monopoly on reality.’ 
Fictionalism about bald-faced lies cannot explain this double abuse: the blatant 
violation of assertoric norms, and the possible undermining of the audience’s epistemic 
assurance. The moral disapproval of this abuse is not a mere a ‘rhetorical illusion,’ as 
Sorensen suggested. 
 
4.2 How do you disagree with a bald-faced liar? 
 
If bald-faced lies were fictional, non-assertions, there should be no disagreements with 
bald-faced liars. But if bald-faced lies are assertions that exploit conversational and 
assertoric norms, we can disagree with a bald-faced liar. Indeed, it’s because an 
assertion is made that the bald-faced liar and his audience can disagree in attitude and 
in activity. Disagreement with a bald-face liar requires more than restating the truth 
through fact-checking. As Lithwick pointed out, endlessly correcting the conversational 
record runs the risk of producing white noise, without preventing the undermining of 
the epistemic assurance of the audience.  
The Scaramucci and Giuliani cases show that there are disagreements that 
involve more than uttering inconsistent propositions. There is no incompatibility in 
raising the hypothesis that p and raising the hypothesis that not-p in a context, for 
instance. For two claims to be incompatible, their acceptance must conflict in the right 
way. Incompatible context update proposals must involve the relevant normative 
illocutionary force. Otherwise there would be no difference between adding to context p 
as asserted, and adding p as conjectured; but there is such a difference. Thus, 
interlocutors’ disagreement can concern whether it is permissible to allow a context 
update proposal with p as asserted.  
On Stalnaker’s definition of common ground (see above, section 2.2) it is 
possible that a proposition is accepted for the purpose of the conversation but not 
believed. This possibility is the possibility of defective contexts, for instance, that a 
                                               
22 Marques (2020). 
 14 
speaker can ‘say something that shows that she believes that it is (or will be) common 
belief that φ where the addressee does not believe that φ, even after recognizing that the 
speaker is presupposing it’ (p. 717). The defective context can be rectified if the 
addressee comes to accommodate that φ, not by coming to believe the false proposition 
presupposed by the other speaker, but by accepting it as part of the common ground (p. 
718) If false presuppositions can be accommodated in context, so can false assertions.  
Now, what the Giuliani and Scaramucci cases show is that the accommodation 
of an assertion requires more than accommodating the proposition asserted. As we 
argue in Marques and García-Carpintero (2020), contexts are more than sets of 
propositions accepted as part of the common ground. Contexts are structured by 
commitments to propositions under different illocutionary forces (or different modes), 
and different speech acts require different commitments.23 How can this help to explain 
disagreement with a bald-faced liar? The bald-faced liar puts forward a proposition p as 
asserted. The disagreement with the speaker cannot be about whether p is true, since it 
is common knowledge that p is false. The disagreement is also not about whether the 
speaker asserted – arguably that is also common knowledge. The disagreement can 
nonetheless be about whether the illocutionary effects of an assertion are allowed to 
update context. The speaker and the audience can disagree in attitude whenever they 
have incompatible intentions concerning permissible illocutionary context updates24. A 
speaker and audience can also disagree in activity if and when they act on these 
incompatible intentions concerning permissible context updates. The student wants to 
be on record as having asserted his innocence; the dean and the professor do not want it. 
Pantangelli wants to be on record as having asserted his ignorance of Corleone's crimes; 
the FBI and the US Senate do not, etc.25  
The update of context with a false p as the content of an act of fiction-making, or 
hypothetically as a conjecture, would not have been reprehensible. It is reprehensible if 
p is asserted. Hence, context updates register not just the uttered propositions, but also 
the normative changes effected by the speech acts performed in uttering them. And it is 
because p, which we know to be false, is asserted that we disagree with the speaker, 
whereas we wouldn’t disagree with the speaker had p been uttered ‘symbolically,’ or 
‘hypothetically.’ Disagreement with a bald-faced liar requires, then, resisting the 
illocutionary effects his assertion would otherwise have. This resistance can function by 
blocking illocutionary assertoric effects,26 or through retroactive illocutionary 
disablement27. But whereas attempts to block what Langton (2018) calls ‘backdoor 
speech-acts’ can be very difficult, blocking a bald-faced lie can effectively resort to 




I have argued that there are reasons to treat bald-faced lies as assertions, against the 
arguments of Keiser and Maitra to the contrary. We accuse bald-faced liars of lying, and 
in defence they often return the accusation. When cornered, bald-faced liars may lie 
again, now about the speech acts they had previously made.  
I suggested that, as assertions, bald-faced lies openly and shamelessly violate 
assertoric norms, while often exploiting the illocutionary effects of assertions to 
                                               
23 See also García-Carpintero (2015). 
24 I offered a definition of attitude incompatibility in earlier work (Marques, 2016, p. 313) 
25 Khoo and Knobe (2016) argue that incompatible context-update proposals are disagreements. 
26 See Langton (2018). 
27  See Langton (1993). 
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produce further perlocutionary effects. The illocutionary effects of assertions include 
the audience’s uptake that an act conforming to assertoric norms has been made. 
Common perlocutionary effects often include gaslighting. Disagreement with a bald-
faced liar requires that we block those illocutionary effects, and one good way of doing 
so is to denounce their lies. 
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